Centrica v Corus UK Ltd [2003] EWHC 2395 (20/10/03). A claim for breach of confidentiality in relation to a trade secret failed on the proper construction of the relevant licence granting the right to use the technology at issue.
The case concerns the trial of the following preliminary issues in the High Court:
- were the defendants liable to Centria in respect of use of the Technology?; and if so
- when did such liability arise? And were Centria estopped from asserting their cause of action?
The answer to the first of these questions turned on the true construction of the Licence Agreement (see below).
The technology in question is called Versacor ("Technology"). It is a coating which is used to protect metal sheets from extreme environmental conditions. It is mainly used in making buildings. This Technology has always been a trade secret and has never been in the public domain.
The Technology was originally developed by a US company called H.H. Robertson Co ("HHR"). In 1990 HHR merged with another company called Ceco Industries Inc to form Robertson-Ceco Corporation ("RC"). HHR and RC continued to use the Technology.
The dispute between the parties had its origins in an agreement dated 20 December 1991 in which RC sold some of its business to a company called United Dominions Industries Inc. ("UDI"). One of the terms of this sale agreement was to execute an Intellectual Property Licence Agreement with substantially the same terms as the term sheet which was attached as an exhibit.
Considerable renegotiation of the terms took place and the signed agreement ("1992 Licence") executed between RC and UDI seemed to envisage a different scheme from the term sheet. Basically the term sheet provided for a licence to use the know how in the US only. The actual 1992 Licence was strangely drafted and included a worldwide exclusive licence to the know how, but only a restricted licence to use the trade marks in the US. RC reserved the right to use the trade marks in relation to the know how for the rest of the world. The parties also agreed to share improvements for use under the licence which was not much use when they had granted an exclusive licence. Additional provisions dealt with territorial restrictions and the transfer of know how within the US.
In 1996 Centria acquired such part of the business from UDI and alleged that by virtue of this acquisition it acquired an exclusive world-wide licence to the Technology.
In May 2000 Centria claimed that as successor to UDI they had an exclusive worldwide right to the Technology. The defendants claimed that Centria only have exclusive rights to the Technology in America (and other defined territories).
Mr Justice Hart expressed the opinion that that 1992 Licence was poorly drafted. In construing the agreement he concentrated on the wording of the Licence and what made commercial sense at the time of drafting the agreement. The judge did not allow Centria to infer complex ideas into the document for which there was little evidence.
Mr Justice Hart remarked that the worldwide exclusive licence to use the know how but only a licence to use the trade marks within the US a "commercial puzzle" and explained the meaning of an exclusive licence and the fact that it was at odds with the rest of the agreement.
Also, RC was never in a position to grant an exclusive licence because certain of its subsidiaries overseas were already licensed to use the know how and this fact was well known to the parties at the time.
The judge ruled that the phrase "the right to use the Shared Know-How only within the American Territory" were unambiguous and fatal to Centria's claim. Mr Justice Hart concluded that Centria's claim failed simply because the right to which it claims to have succeeded is, as a matter of construction, a right to use the Technology only within the US. None of the defendants have at any time acted inconsistently with that right, or any obligation of confidence which they may owe to Centria as a result of its existence.
The point of estoppel was discussed but not relevant to the ruling once the first issue had been decided.
Hart J suggested that the doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence should apply to Centria. This is because they did not assert their claim to an exclusive worldwide right until 2000. The 1992 Licence was executed in 1992. Centria were aware that the defendants were using the technology outside America for 8 years and Centria allowed them to do so. Hart J believed that Centria should be estopped by acquiescence despite the fact that the claimant did not know it had a claimed right. Hart J suggests that in this case it would be enough for the claimant to have no excuse as to his lack of knowledge.
EC formally adopts a Decision and Regulation linking Madrid Protocol with Community Trade Mark (27/10/03).
The text of the European Council's decision of 27 October 2003 (2003/793/EC) approving the Madrid Protocol is now available in the Official Journal, together with the text of the regulation of the same date (1992/2003/EC) amending the Community Trade Mark (CTM) Regulation in order to give effect to the European Community's accession to the Madrid Protocol (OJ 2003 L296/1 and L296/20).
Once accession takes effect, CTM applicants and proprietors (domiciled in one of the Member States of the Community) will be able to apply for international protection of their marks through the filing of an international application under the Madrid Protocol. Conversely, an applicant for registration of a mark, in say, the US (the US are now members of the Madrid Protocol), will be able to designate registration of the mark in the EU as a CTM without having to make a separate application.
See www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/archive/2003/l_29620031114en.html